Persistence of corruption and some macroeconomic implications: an evolutionary game approach by Wagner, Elisa Machado
Elisa Machado Wagner
PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION AND SOME
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS:
AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME APPROACH
Dissertac¸a˜o submetida ao Programa
de Po´s-Graduac¸a˜o em Economia para
a obtenc¸a˜o do Grau de Mestrado.
Orientador
Universidade Federal de Santa Cata-
rina: Prof. Dr. Jaylson Jair da Sil-
veira
Floriano´polis
2017
Ficha de identificação da obra elaborada pelo autor,
 através do Programa de Geração Automática da Biblioteca Universitária da UFSC.
Wagner, Elisa Machado
   Persistence of Corruption and some Macroeconomic
Implications : An Evolutionary Game Approach /
Elisa Machado Wagner ; orientador, Jaylson Jair da
Silveira - Florianópolis, SC, 2017.
   71 p.
 - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro
Sócio-Econômico, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia,
Florianópolis, 2017.
   Inclui referências. 
   1. Economia. 2. Corrupção. 3. Crescimento
econômico. 4. Jogos Evolucionários. I. Silveira,
Jaylson Jair da. II. Universidade Federal de Santa
Catarina. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia. III.
Título.
Elisa Machado Wagner
PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION AND SOME
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS: AN
EVOLUTIONARY GAME APPROACH
Esta Dissertac¸a˜o foi julgada para a
obtenc¸a˜o do T´ıtulo de “Mestrado”, e em
sua forma final pelo Programa de Po´s-Graduac¸a˜o em Economia.
Floriano´polis, 7 de abril 2017.
Prof. Dr. Jaylson Jair da Silveira
Coordenador
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Banca Examinadora:
Marcelo de Carvalho Griebeler
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Eva Yamila Amanda da Silva Catela
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Guilherme Valle Moura
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
For my daughter

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Jaylson Silveira for his inspiration
and guidance.
I would also like to thank Jesse, my husband. His patience and
support have helped me achieve my goals.
Last but not the least, I am greatful to my parents, Nilson and
Nazare´, for always supporting and encouraging me in my intelectual
and personal growth.

“When you see corruption being rewar-
ded and honesty becoming a self-sacrifice,
you may know that your society is doo-
med.”
(Ayn Rand, 1957)

RESUMO
Sera˜o apresentados dois modelos sobre corrupc¸a˜o de um ponto de vista
de jogos evoluciona´rios. O primeiro trata da persisteˆncia da corrupc¸a˜o
do ponto de vista microeconoˆmico, como resultado de interac¸o˜es entre
indiv´ıduos. No´s mostramos que a dinaˆmica evoluciona´ria sempre leva a
economia a um estado com corrupc¸a˜o permanente. A depender do valor
de paraˆmetros como tributac¸a˜o, probabilidade de punic¸a˜o e tamanho
da pena, a corrupc¸a˜o pode se apresentar em maior ou menor grau
na sociedade. O segundo modelo incorpora o n´ıvel de corrupc¸a˜o ao
modelo de crescimento de Solow-Swan com gasto produtivo do governo,
baseado em Barro (1990). No´s mostramos que o n´ıvel de corrupc¸a˜o
depende da punic¸a˜o esperada e da taxa tributa´ria. Quanto maior a
proporc¸a˜o de indiv´ıduos corruptos, menor a renda per capita, o que traz
a` luz a importaˆncia da corrupc¸a˜o para explicar o subdesenvolvimento.
Palavras-chave: Corrupc¸a˜o. Jogos Evoluciona´rios. Dinaˆmica Satisfi-
cing.

ABSTRACT
We will develop two models about corruption under an evolutionary
perspective. The first one shows that the pervasiveness of corruption
is a result of interactions between individuals. We show that the evo-
lutionary dynamics will always lead the economy to a situation with
permanent corruption. The level of corruption depends on parameters
such as the tax rate, the probability of being punished and the punish-
ment size. The second model introduces corruption to the Solow-Swan
model with productive government expenditure, based on Barro (1990).
We will show that the level of corruption depends on the expected pu-
nishment and on the tax rate. The more widespread the corruption,
the smaller the income per capita, what enlightens the issue of how
corruption affects development.
Keywords: Corruption. Evolutionary Games. Satisficing Dynamics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent international corruption scandals like the one involving
Brazilian enterprises and several countries’ governments around the
globe brought the subject back to the spotlights. In special, the re-
lationship between widespread corruption and fragile economical and
political performances call attention to the importance of the quality
of public governance for economic development.
Several empirical studies show that high levels of corruption are
associated with lower investment and entrepreneurship as well as slower
development (see Avnimelech, Zelekha e Sharabi (2014), Wei (2000),
Swaleheen e Stansel (2007)). These relationships together with the
quality of institutions in force in each society (see Treisman (2000))
enlighten the issue of why corruption tends to be so persistent and
pervasive in some societies.
Some of the institutional features that have been found by em-
pirical works as important to explaining corruption are hard (or even
impossible) to change through policy. This fact together with evidence
that the relationship between corruption and slower economic develop-
ment is bicausal (TREISMAN, 2000) help to understand why corruption
is so hard to eradicate in the short run.
There are many definitions of corruption. Here, we will define it
as an illegal rent seeking activity where the public official uses the public
office for private gain. It is common to mistake other illegal activities,
such as money laundry for corruption. But these activities do not
constitute corruption as we understand it, since they do not depend on
public officials taking benefits from their public office. Corruption can
occur at different spheres of the public sector, from the bureaucratic
level to the political and judicial levels. We will focus on bureaucratic
corruption, sometimes also called petty corruption.
We understand corruption—just as any other feature of a society—
as a result of continuous interactions of individuals making decisions
to obtain the maximum well being possible. Although corruption pro-
duces a worse outcome for the society as a whole, in some scenarios it
might be the best response for reasonable individuals. When corruption
is too widespread and poorly combated, non-corrupt people might be
excluded from obtaining certain benefits offered by the public sphere,
such as services or contracts.
Evolutionary games allow us to describe the dynamics of the
processes that explain the evolution of cultural features of a society,
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such as its level of corruption. They offer a mechanism for equilibrium
selection and allow us to take into account the dynamic aspect of the
process we are analyzing. We will be able to investigate why corruption
persists and why it may vary widely among economies.
We will develop two models. The first one will focus on the
persistence and pervasiveness of corruption in a society, from a micro-
economic point of view. We will develop an evolutionary game model
based on individual decisions about being productive or corrupt, to
explain the persistence of corruption. The model is followed by a dis-
cussion of its implications.
In the second model we introduce corruption in an augmen-
ted Solow-Swan model with productive government expenditure, again
from an evolutionary perspective. This allows us to analyze some ef-
fects corruption has on the long run per capita income. From this
result, we can infer why widespread corruption is commonly associated
with lower levels of development.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we will define
corruption and briefly review the empirical and theoretical works on the
subject. Next, in Chapter 3, we will present the first model, followed
by the second model, in the fourth chapter. Finally, we will discuss our
conclusions.
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2 CORRUPTION: A REVIEW
In the past few decades a lot of effort has been made by eco-
nomists to explain why income inequality between countries persists.
Countries with similar economic structures will not necessarily con-
verge to the same steady state or balanced growth path. These facts
turned the attention of economists towards the importance of instituti-
ons that define the rules according to which individuals play the social-
economic game. The quality of the institutions in place in a country
will determine both the initial conditions and the path through which
the development will happen. By institutions we mean “the humanly
devised constraints that structure human interaction. They consist of
formal rules (constitutions, stature and common law, and regulations),
informal rules (conventions, moral rules, and social norms), and the
enforcement characteristics of each” (MANTZAVINOS; NORTH; SHARIQ,
2004, p.77).
One important consequence of a country’s institutions is its level
of corruption. Although it is well known that the level of corruption
affects the growth path of an economy, its role in economic development
has not been fully understood so far. Some ways that corruption may
affect income distribution are by concentrating the efforts and benefits
of public policies to some particular interest. It may also distort the
investment decisions by altering the returns of different activities as
well as moving consumption to foreign countries, as the stolen money
might be stored in foreign banks (MACRAE, 1982).
An important characteristic of corruption is that, when it hap-
pens at higher levels of the government, it can affect the quality of
institutions, (e.g. the quality of the legal system and its enforcement)
and lead to a vicious cycle, where corruption generates bad institutions
that protect corrupt behavior, which in turn generates more bad insti-
tutions. In fact, that is what the more general definition of corruption
states: to corrupt is to degenerate; to modify something, tampering
with its original features. In that sense, history is also an important
factor to explain how corruption evolves in a society. History provides
the starting point that will lead to an equilibrium where the society
will be trapped. This pervasiveness of corruption can be explained by
the historical inertia of the institutions and social norms that support
corrupt acts.
The definition of corruption we will assume here is less broad,
but contains this same essence. We will define corruption as Jain (2001,
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p.73) suggests as “acts in which the power of public office is used for
personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game”.
Moreover, as Macrae (1982) advocates, we understand that corruption
is not a behavior that opposes the profit motivated operations. It is
instead “part of a rational calculus and an integral and often deeply-
rooted method by which reasonable men take decisions” (MACRAE,
1982, p.678). As Bicchieri e Rovelli (1995) emphasize, corruption is not
the result of extortion or violence, rather it is the result of voluntary
exchanges.
We can also think of the dishonest behavior of public officials
from the principal-agent problem perspective. The social benefit of
public services is not aligned with the public official’s interests, much
like the misalignment of the interests of a private firm and those of its
employees (ANDVIG; MOENE, 1990).
The ancient records about the practice and penalties for cor-
ruption (22nd century B.C. in Babylon and 14th century Egypt) point
to the fact that corruption is a common practice in different socie-
ties throughout history (MISHRA, 2006). Even in societies with anti-
corruption policies, corruption has been shown to be pervasive. The
ways in which corruption manifests itself vary, but we can classify it
in three different categories, according to Jain (2001). The first one is
“grand corruption”, where the ruling elite defines the public policies
in its own self-interest to the detriment of the public interest. The
second, “bureaucratic corruption” (often called petty corruption) hap-
pens when bureaucrats take bribes either to provide the service that
they are already supposed to (e.g. speeding up a bureaucratic proce-
dure), or to do something against their duties that benefits some private
interest. As we will see, this is usually the type of corruption addressed
in most of the economic works, since it is easier to identify its economi-
cal motivations. The third category is “legislative corruption”, when
legislators take bribes that influence their decisions. For example, “le-
gislators can be bribed by interest groups to enact legislation that can
change the economic rents associated with assets” (JAIN, 2001, p.75).
The fact that corruption is present in important functions of the go-
vernment, which cannot be easily eliminated, is one reason that may
help us to understand why corruption is so persistent (MISHRA, 2006).
For corruption to happen three necessary conditions have to be
fulfilled. First, the public authority has to have discretionary power
to design and administer regulations; second there must be economic
rents associated with this power; and third, the legal system has to
have some degree of ineffectiveness in detecting and punishing corrupt
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behavior (JAIN, 2001).
2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES
One could question the reliability of the data on corruption for
its subjective nature as well as for its measurement limitations. No-
netheless, there are several empirical works that could help us refine
our understanding of corruption and its implications for an economy’s
performance. Avnimelech, Zelekha e Sharabi (2014), using a sample of
176 countries, found empirical evidence that countries with high levels
of corruption, measured by the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index (CPI), usually exhibit low levels of productive entre-
preneurship. Mo (2001) and Wei (2000) using cross-country data show
that there is a negative relationship between corruption and economic
growth. For measuring corruption, Mo (2001) uses the CPI, for the
period between 1980 and 1985, for 46 countries. For Mo (2001) the
main channel through which corruption affects growth is political ins-
tability. The other channels he considers include the share of private
investment and human capital. He argues that political instability is
generated by income inequality, which in turn is caused by corruption.
Political instability is responsible for uncertainty about protection of
property rights and reduces the level of investment and productivity,
negatively affecting the growth rate. Wei (2000) argues that one im-
portant transmission channel is foreign direct investment. Countries
with a higher level of corruption tend to receive less direct investment,
while foreign bank loans are not necessarily affected, distorting the
composition of their capital inflows. This may be due to the vulnera-
bility of direct investment to the intervention of corrupt local officials.
For measuring corruption, Wei (2000) creates a composite index for 69
countries of two other indices based on surveys of business executives.
These are the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and the World
Development Report (WDR).
In contrast, Swaleheen e Stansel (2007) find that although cor-
ruption has a negative impact on the economic growth of countries
with less economic freedom, in countries with higher economic freedom
corruption is likely to positively affect economic growth. A reason for
that could be that in some countries, bribes make public officials less
likely to enforce restrictions in the private sector, allowing greater free
exchange. The authors estimate a panel of 60 countries between the ye-
ars 1995 and 2004. For measuring corruption they use the CPI, while
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for measuring economic freedom, they use Economic Freedom Index
(EFI) by the Heritage Foundation. In the same vein, Me´on e Weill
(2010), arguing that corruption might remove bureaucratic obstacles,
find evidence that corruption may function as “grease in the wheels”
in countries with sluggish bureaucratic systems. They estimate a panel
using 69 countries between 2000 and 2003. To assess the effect of cor-
ruption, they use two different indices, the corruption index provided
by the World Bank and the CPI. To measure the institutional effici-
ency and excesses of bureaucracy, they use a range of indicators of the
quality of governance, provided by Kaufmann et al (1999a, 1999b).
Another possible effect of corruption is on fiscal policy. Using
Romanian data from 2000 to 2011, Apergis, Da˘nulet¸iu et al. (2013) find
that corruption, as well as other institutional variables, have a bi-causal
relationship with the public deficit. They show that an improvement
in freedom and corruption lowers the public deficit in Romania.
To address the issue of the importance of the size and scope of
government on the incidence of corruption, Goel e Nelson (2010) esti-
mate cross-country random effects models, covering the period between
1995 and 2003. The authors also analyze the effect of historical and
geographical aspects on the level of corruption. They show that both
the size of the government as well as the level of centralization are
important variables to explain corruption, using the CPI index. They
measure the government intervention level calculating two different in-
dices, one emphasizing fiscal and the other monetary aspects of go-
vernment intervention. Their results point to the fact that although
greater governments are associated with more corruption, governments
that engage in more intervention tend to reduce corruption, maybe due
to a higher vigilance against corruption. They also find that the more
decentralized the government, the lower the corruption practices. That
does not rule out the hypothesis that bigger intervention on the regu-
latory area might promote corruption. Their study also shows that the
level of corruption responds to the prevailing commercial code. Rela-
tive to historical and geographical aspects, Goel e Nelson (2010) find
that the population distribution over the country and the influence of
past institutions and norms are important in explaining the corruption
level.
Some of these studies help to support our results that the higher
the government participation—that we measure as the tax rate—the
higher the corruption level. When corruption is more widespread, the
costs of corruption are smaller and the incentives for being corrupt are
stronger. In this scenario, the level of entrepreneurship and the output
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produced are lower, because fewer individuals are going to choose to
engage in productive activities when it is possible to get a higher return
on corrupt activities.
2.2 CORRUPTION PERSISTENCY
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that much atten-
tion was paid to the effects of bribery and rent seeking on economic
performance. In this section we will present a summary of some of the
most relevant research that has been done about the subject. The vast
majority of the economic works on this subject adopts Becker (1968)
assertion that crimes are committed as a response to incentives.
In her seminal paper, Krueger (1974) shows that the welfare costs
of rent seeking exceed those of government intervention by analyzing
the competition for import licenses. It is important to differentiate rent
seeking from bribery and corruption. Not all rent seeking activities are
illegal or depend on bribery. For example, when competing for an
import license, the allocation of which is proportional to the firm’s
physical plant, some firms may expand their productive capacity even
when that would not be efficient in a scenario without import licenses.
In this case, the rent seeker is adapting its strategy to the new rules
defined by a government intervention. It chooses a new strategy that
will yield the highest payoff given that the other firms will also change
their behaviors. A special case of rent seeking happens when bribery
is a possible strategy to influence the government decision about the
allocation of contracts. For corruption to occur, the bribing firm has
to meet a bureaucrat that is willing to accept the bribe to influence the
allocation of the contracts.
Following this premise Rose-Ackerman (1975) proposes three
models wherein firms compete for a contract while bureaucrats de-
cide if they take bribes to influence the results of the competition.
Rose-Ackerman (1975) designs her utility maximization models con-
sidering two possible market structures, a competitive market and a
bilateral monopoly. She finds that there is an optimum value of the
bribe that equates the firm’s impatience to the bureaucrat’s lack of
urgency. Furthermore, her results point to the fact that the type of
market structure affects the corrupt relationships and the incentives
for bribery.
Introducing a game theory approach, Macrae (1982) contribu-
tes to the debate of the fundamentals of corruption by developing a
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prisoner’s dilemma game. By doing that, he attempts to take into ac-
count the bargaining dynamics and risks of this sort of situation that
a mere utility maximization approach cannot capture. His objective
was to explain why corruption is omnipresent in different societies fo-
cusing on the rationality of the decisions to be corrupt. He finds that
being corrupt is an equilibrium. He also argues that the legal solutions
are ineffective in controlling the level of corruption. That argument is
justifiable if we consider that in reality corruption tends to spread to
different levels of a society, also tampering with the legal system.
The decay of moral values and social norms or the lack of some
sort of legal or moral punishment may be appealing arguments to ex-
plain the pervasiveness of corruption. However, they do not seem to be
sufficient to explain the differences in corruption within countries (e.g.
northern and southern Italy) or how corruption could be eradicated in
some countries in a short period of time (e.g. Singapore). One possible
explanation for this phenomena is the existence of multiple equilibria.
That arises from the fact that the decision to be corrupt depends on
the level of corruption. Moreover, it depends on how individuals per-
ceive how much corruption takes place around them. If a person sees
that there is a great deal of corruption occurring, she is more likely
to act in the same manner because she does not fear disapproval or
moral coercion. In addition, when corruption is more widespread, the
costs of finding a corrupt bureaucrat are lower. The level of corrup-
tion perceived affects both the expected benefits of corrupt acts and
the perception of the probability of being punished. These together
compose the expected return on corruption. The level of corruption
affects the expected benefits by reducing the income available, since
more people engage in and waste time on corrupt activities instead of
being productive. It also reduces the gains from corruption. When a
bureaucrat is bribed by everyone that is competing for a contract, the
chance of a given briber getting the contract decreases. On the side
of the bureaucrat, if there is more corruption, bribers will probably be
willing to pay less, since they are going to have to bribe more often.
When corruption is more widespread, people might perceive more im-
punity and think the probability of being punished is lower (BARDHAN,
2006).
It is worth noting the distinction between being caught and being
punished. In a country with widespread corruption, the chances of
being caught might be high, but it might be easy to pay a different bribe
to convince the authorities to look the other way. Being punished, in
contrast, means facing the negative consequences. One should also pay
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attention to the distinction between the perceived probability and the
actual probability of being punished. The actual probability depends
on the legal system. If corruption has spread to the legal system, the
enforcement of the law will be negatively affected. The perceived pro-
bability, on the other hand, depends on peoples expectations. When
there is no uncertainty about what the effectiveness of the law is, then
they are equivalent.
Considering the dynamic nature of corruption, Andvig e Mo-
ene (1990) develop a model with multiple equilibria where they seek
to explain why different levels of corruption can arise in societies with
similar socioeconomic structures. Although this is not formally an evo-
lutionary game, it presents some important features that resemble an
evolutionary approach. They argue that the return on corrupt acts is
associated with its relative frequency among bureaucrats. That is, the
more corrupt bureaucrats there are, the higher the payoff of being cor-
rupt. Their model focuses on the bureaucrat’s decision to take bribes,
given that there is a demand for corrupt acts. One interesting feature
of their model is that the probability of being punished is associated
with the probability of other bureaucrats being corrupt. That leads
to the somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion that the value of the bri-
bes increase when corruption is more widespread. This conclusion is
counter-intuitive because one would expect that the bribe size rises with
the probability of being detected, as shown by Basu, Basu e Cordella
(2014), which in the Andvig e Moene (1990) model is assumed to fall
with the number of corrupt officials.
In their paper, Bicchieri e Rovelli (1995) design infinitely repe-
ated prisoner’s dilemma, where individuals again chose between being
corrupt or honest. A small number of the individuals are assumed not
to change their behavior throughout time, while all the others cho-
ose their strategy based on what the other individuals did in the past
period. They let the payoffs decrease over time to account for the ne-
gative effect that corruption has in the society, in a manner that the
payoffs ordination is maintained. They find that corruption is a do-
minant strategy and the society will converge to an equilibrium where
many people choose to be corrupt. That happens until a certain cri-
tical period, when the honest strategy starts to offer a higher payoff
and becomes dominant, due to the erosion effect of corruption. Their
model shares some characteristics with an evolutionary game, in the
sense that it allows individuals to adapt their strategies over time after
observing the results of that period. To do so, though, they have to
assume that the payoffs and played strategies of each player are public
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knowledge after each period, which is not quite realistic.
One important conclusion that runs through many of the pre-
sented works so far is that the wages of the public officials are one
of the determinants of the level of corruption at the equilibrium (see
Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Andvig e Moene (1990)). Therefore, many
economists would argue that increasing the wage in the public sector
could be a good policy to push the country towards the low-corruption
equilibrium. This argument seems to have some problems. First of
all, it encourages corrupt politicians and corrupt bureaucrats to make
their extraction official, by giving themselves raises. Second, in prac-
tice that is not what we observe. In countries like Brazil where, on
average, public officials’ revenues are higher than those of the private
sector (according to Souza e Medeiros (2013), public employees are
paid on average 20% more than private employees in equivalent functi-
ons), corruption is still perceived to be high (according to Transparency
International, in 2015, Brazil scored 38 out of 100 in the Corruption
Perception Index, being in position 76 in a sample of 168 countries).
In fact, Porta et al. (1999) argue that in countries where bureaucrats
have relatively more power, they collect both higher wages and higher
bribes.
Multiple equilibria models played an important role in unfolding
some features of corruption. However, these models cannot explain why
different equilibria arise in different situations as well as how equilibria
change over time. In the same manner, a pure institutional approach is
insufficient to explain the differences in corruption across comparable
countries or regions within the same country. Knowing this, Sah (2007)
attempts to analyze corruption focusing on its inertial nature. Indivi-
duals observe their environment and perceive corruption at a certain
level, and then make their decisions based on their perceptions. Sah
(2007) develops a model of overlapping generations where citizens cho-
ose whether or not to cheat, and bureaucrats choose whether or not to
be corrupt. Individuals construct and revise their beliefs about what
is the better strategy at each period based on what they observe in the
past period. The decision about being corrupt is made ex post,after
the non-corrupt individual meets a corrupt one.
He concludes that even people who live in the same environ-
ment could have different perceptions of corruption, which would affect
their behavior. Also, he finds that a greater prevalence of cheating or
corruption in the past leads to a greater prevalence of cheating and cor-
ruption in the future. This could explain differences between countries
or regions with similar institutions. A disturbance at some point in
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time in one region or country could lead to a greater level of corruption
that would be carried for the future. In his model, there will always be
some level of corruption. Sah (2007) does not examine the relationships
between corruption and growth, efficiency and welfare. Lastly, he de-
rives a simple evolutionary dynamic, from which he concludes that the
level of corruption in the economy will persist in the future.
Following Sah’s steps, our argument here is that an evolutio-
nary game theory approach is a more suitable way to understand the
persistence and pervasiveness of corruption. With such a theory it is
possible to make formally explicit the microeconomic motivations that
determine each agent’s choices in a strategic environment. The ma-
croeconomic setting, in turn, is affected by the individuals collectively
and affects their choices, in a way that the adopted strategies and the
macroeconomic environment co-evolve.
Evolutionary games provide a mechanism for equilibrium selec-
tion that is suitable for our analysis, since we are analyzing a dynamic
process in which individuals from a big population make decisions th-
roughout several periods of time. This allows us to analyze the path to
the long run equilibrium and the parameters that determine its shape.
Contrary to a Nash equilibrium, evolutionary games do not rely on the
requirement that players have correct beliefs about other players rati-
onality. They allow us to formulate a model where the players have
a bounded rationality, in the sense that they do not necessarily have
the whole game formulated in their minds before they make decisions
and take actions. Instead, they do not know or do not care about the
effects of their decisions on the rest of the society (SAMUELSON, 1998).
Not every Nash equilibrium is an evolutionary stable equilibrium,
but every evolutionary stable strategy is at least a weak best response to
itself, and is hence a Nash equilibrium (SAMUELSON, 2002). It is worth
noting that, as evolutionary stable strategies are also Nash equilibria,
there is some level of rationality on the decisions players make (VEGA-
REDONDO, 1996).
I will now highlight two other main works that treat corruption
from an evolutionary standpoint: Mishra (2006), and Verma e Sengupta
(2015). In Mishra (2006) model, the corrupt strategy is a “mutation”
that invades a society with originally only honest citizens. Mishra as-
sumes that individuals change their strategies by an imitation process.
The corrupt behavior is shown to be an evolutionarily stable strategy,
while the honest behavior is not.
His model ignores some important features of corruption and
leads to quite an unrealistic result. In a society it is not likely that we
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have an equilibrium situation where everyone is corrupt. Instead, what
we observe is some combination of individuals being corrupt and some
being honest. Moreover, someone who is dishonest in one situation is
not necessarily dishonest in another. It is probable that individuals
are going to adapt their behavior depending on the situation they are
facing, based on a learning process. This implies that each individual
has in its set of strategies the possible strategies ex ante. Furthermore,
the size of the corrupt population is likely to affect the payoffs by
decreasing the total income available in this society.
Verma e Sengupta (2015), considering such characteristics of
corruption, design an asymmetric evolutionary game where there are
two kinds of players: citizens and public officials. The citizens choose
between three possible strategies: paying bribes silently, paying and
complaining to the legal authorities and not paying; while the public
officials choose between demanding bribes or not. The citizen’s payoffs
depend on the benefits of the public service, the bribe size, the costs
of complaining, the probability that a complaint will lead to a prose-
cution, the refund for the citizen in case the bribe is found out and
the penalties, which they allow to be different for citizens and public
officials. They use replicator dynamics, assuming that in every period
the least-fit player is replaced by a better-fit one, to explain each sub-
population’s arrangements. They find that allowing for asymmetric
penalties and considering the ease of denouncing as well as if the bribe
is fully refunded, corruption can be extinguished from a society. If the
rate of apathetic citizens who pay the bribe silently is bigger than a
threshold, all the honest public officials are eliminated.
Then, they consider the scenario where public officials also de-
mand public services. In this model they again use an imitation process
to explain how the subpopulations evolve. Their conclusions regarding
penalties, refunds and ease of denouncing remain the same. This new
model allows consideration of the effect of empathy on bribery. Public
officials who pay bribes to other public officials are less likely to demand
bribes from citizens in the future.
Our proposal for the first model is to take into account the effect
of each subpopulation’s relative frequency on each strategy’s expected
payoff, and consequently on the players choices. We base our first
model in the Lotka-Volterra model developed by Griebeler e Hillbrecht
(2015), where this hypothesis is considered. Griebeler argues that in
some economies, the productive sector is unable to develop due to the
presence of a “parasite” sector, a sector that survives and multiplies
at the expense of the productive sector. The size of each population
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depends on institutional variables, like law enforcement and guarantee
of property rights. Furthermore, his model points to the possibility of
a poverty trap. Considering a developing economy, where the initial
income is low, it is not possible for the economy to grow consistently in
the presence of parasites. Both populations will fluctuate around the
low income equilibrium and there will not be endogenous forces able to
push it towards the high income equilibrium.
2.3 CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
As it has already been argued in the previous sections, there
is empirical evidence of the negative relationship between corruption
and economic growth, investment and entrepreneurship. The effects of
corruption in growth models have been explored by some theoretical
works. We are going to highlight the main ones that relate to the model
we will develop in Chapter 4.
Extending the Solow model to include corruption as a determi-
nant of government expenditure, private investment and foreign aid,
Farida, Ahmadi-Esfahani et al. (2008) conclude that corruption redu-
ces the effectiveness of physical and human capital and the output per
worker. By reducing the output per worker, corruption indirectly re-
duces investment which in turn has a negative effect on the growth of
output per worker. Next, they test these results empirically for Le-
banon, between 1985 and 2005. They find evidence that corruption
decreases Lebanon’s standards of living, investment and human capital
productivity.
In the same vein, Ellis e Fender (2006) devise an augmented
Ramsey model to account for corruption and how it affects the growth
rate and the level of output. He shows that higher levels of corruption
are associated with lower level of output growth, yet this relationship is
not causal. In their model, corruption is determined by “deep economic
parameters” including the degree of transparency of the fiscal system.
It does not make clear the direct relationship between corruption and
economic growth. The model was not able to address the negative
relationship between corruption and private capital accumulation.
Blackburn, Bose e Haque (2006) develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model of growth in which households bribe bureaucrats for tax
evasion. The costs of keeping this activity secret reduce the availa-
ble resources for productive investments. In their model, there is a
two-way causality between corruption and economic development. The
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interaction between bureaucrats and economic activity gives rise to an
endogenous threshold effect and the possibility of multiple equilibria.
The existence of multiple equilibria can explain why countries with
similar structural characteristics may present very different levels of
development and quality of governance.
Our proposal for the second model will be to introduce corrup-
tion in the Solow-Swan growth model, following Barro (1990) and Fa-
rida, Ahmadi-Esfahani et al. (2008)’s approach. Unlike the first model,
the gains of corruption now derive from the difference between the go-
vernment’s tax revenue and its productive expenditure. In this second
model we will be able to shed some light on how corruption affects the
capital stock and the income per capita.
33
3 THE PESRISTENCE OF CORRUPTION AS AN
EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
To study the pervasiveness of corruption we now develop an evo-
lutionary game, in which each individual can choose among two stra-
tegies, namely, to be productive or to be corrupt. Each individual in
this society is free to change her strategy at each period, whenever she
thinks the other strategy will be more beneficial to herself.
The evolutionary game approach allows us to consider that the
decision that each individual makes rationally in each period of time
may lead them to a non-optimum situation in the long run. That
happens because the corrupt individuals do not take into account the
agregate negative impact of their own acts on the macroeconomic out-
come that, in turn, affects their gain. In that sense we could say the
individuals have a bounded rationality. They might act like that be-
cause they think their impact is small enough to not to be considered
or because they do not aknowledge the consequences of their actions.
Furthermore, as evolutionary games analyze dynamic process where in-
dividuals grope for the best strategy by revising their strategies recur-
rently in a bounded rationality environment, it is possible to consider
the contagious effect of corruption and how it evolves over time.
3.1 THE SHORT RUN: COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM
We will assume a sufficiently large society, with n individuals,
where each individual’s behavior has a small impact on the whole. Let
n1 be the number of corrupt individuals at a given period, so that
their proportion in the society is given by x = n1/n. The number of
productive individuals is n2, so their proportion in the society is given
by 1− x = n2/n.
We will denote the corrupt individuals by the subscript c and
the non-corrupt by the subscript n. Each productive individual beha-
ves as a firm, maximizing its profit. Drawing on Griebeler e Hillbrecht
(2015), we will assume that there is one homogeneous good produced
by all the producers and the corrupt individuals expropriate the ta-
xes paid by the productive ones through bribes. We can interpret this
expropriation as the situation where public officials divert public re-
sources to their own or their cohort benefit. In the present model, we
will not make assumptions about how the taxes are expropriated from
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the public domain. One explanation, though, could be through bribes
on overpriced contracts that benefit specific groups in the society.
The short run is defined as the time frame during which the pro-
portion of individuals playing the corrupt strategy, x, is predetermined
and quantities and prices adjust to bring about equilibrium in the mar-
ket, which will be taken as a Cournot oligopoly with n2 = (1 − x)n
producers.
The producers face an inverse linear market demand of the form
p(Q) = a− bQ, (3.1)
where a and b are strictly positive constants, p(Q) is the market price,
Q =
∑n2
i=1 qi is the total demanded quantity in the market and qi is
producer i’s demanded quantity.
We will assume that there are no fixed costs and the total cost
function of the ith firm is linear, that is:
C(qi) = cqi, (3.2)
where c ∈ (0, a) ⊂ R is the constant marginal cost of firm i.
Taxes are collected from profits. Thus, considering (3.1), firm i’s
objective function is given by:
pin = (1− τ)(a− bQ− c)qi, (3.3)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R is the tax rate.
At each period, quantities and prices are decided as in a Cournot
oligopoly game. Firms maximize their profit choosing the quantity they
produce while taking into account their expectations on what other
producer’s chosen quantity will be. The firm i’s best-response function
is, thus,
q∗i =
a− bQ−i − c
2b
, (3.4)
where Q−i is the sum of all producers’ quantities except from firm i. As
all producers have the same cost function and expect the same behavior
from their rivals they will all supply the same quantity, q∗i = q
∗
j ≡ q∗, so
that the total quantity in the short-run Cournot equilibrium is simply:
Q∗ =
n2∑
i=1
qi = n2q
∗. (3.5)
Substituting (3.5) in (3.4) and recalling that n2 = (1−x)n, after
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rearranging the terms in (3.4) we find the quantity suplied by each firm
in the short-run Cournot equilibrium, as follows:
q∗ =
a− c
b[(1− x)n+ 1] . (3.6)
The short-run Cournot equilibrium market price is easily found
by substituting (3.6) in (3.1):
p∗ = p∗(x, q∗) =
a+ (1− x)nc
(1− x)n+ 1 . (3.7)
Note that as corruption falls to zero, the number of producers in-
creases aproaching n and the market becomes more competitive. Since
n is taken as suficiently large, when n2 approaches n, the price becomes
closer to the marginal cost.
From now on, without loss of generality, we will normalize n = 1.
The impact of x on both price and individual producers quantities are
shown below:
∂q∗
∂x
=
a− c
b(2− x)2 > 0 (3.8)
and
∂p∗
∂x
=
a− c
(2− x)2 > 0. (3.9)
When the number of corrupt individuals increases, the number of pro-
ducers falls. That leads to a rise in the quantities produced by each
producer as well as a rise in the market price.
The producer’s expected profit after taxes depends on the pro-
portion of producers in the market. Substituting (3.6) and (3.7) in
equation (3.3), the expected profit each firm earns after taxes is given
by
pi∗n =
(1− τ)
b
(
a− c
2− x
)2
. (3.10)
From (3.10) it follows that:
∂pi∗n
∂x
=
2(1− τ)
b
(a− c)2
(2− x)3 > 0 (3.11)
for all x ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R. In other words, when the proportion of corrupt
individuals is higher, the profit of the productive individuals increase.
This happens because there is less competition in the market and both
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individual produced quantity and market price rise, as shown in (3.8)
and (3.9).
Now let us consider the problem of those individuals who see in
the amount of taxes collected by the government an opportunity for
rent seeking, more specifically, an opportunity for diversion of money.
We will not discuss here how these individuals perform this diversion of
money. We will also not consider the role of the bureaucrats or politi-
cians responsible for the allocation of the government budget. Instead,
we will assume that they do not demand bribes to enable the diversion
of money. We will assume that the corrupt individual faces a probabi-
lity ρ ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R of getting caught and punished with an exogenous
cost ε and a probability of (1 − ρ) of succeeding in the corrupt acti-
vity without being noticed. The cost ε can be interpreted as the cost
of spending time in prison as a punishment. Note that we are not
discussing the ability of the judicial system to enforce the law once
corruption has been detected. Instead, ρ should be understood as the
ability of the judicial system on detecting corruption. Another issue
we will not consider here, is the case where law enforcement is affected
by the level of corruption. In that scenario, our parameter ρ would
be somehow affected by the level of corruption. We will leave that for
future research.
We can write each corrupt individual’s share of the government
total revenue as
T =
τ
b
(
a− c
2− x
)2
n2
n1
=
τ
b
(
a− c
2− x
)2
(1− x)
x
. (3.12)
Based on (3.12)
∂T
∂x
= T
(−2x2 + 3x− 2)
(2− x)x2 < 0 (3.13)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Since the number of corrupt individuals who share
the government revenue increases when corruption rises, the number of
producers falls and the individual producer’s profit rises as shown in
(3.11). This alone would have a positive effect on the government reve-
nue. However, the fall in the number of producers and the rise in the
number of corrupt individuals reduce both the government revenue and
the share for each corrupt individual. This effect, as shown in (3.12),
surpasses the positive effect and T falls. In short, as the number of cor-
rupt individuals increases, each corrupt individual’s share decreases.
The expected return of the corrupt individuals is the weighted
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average between T and the cost of being punished, ε, as follows:
pic = (1− ρ)T + ρ(−ε) (3.14)
Substituting (3.12) in (3.14), we find the the expected payoff of
the corrupt individuals in the short-run Cournot equilibrium:
pi∗c = (1− ρ)
τ
b
(
a− c
2− x
)2
(1− x)
x
− ρε. (3.15)
Considering (3.12), from (3.15) we can conclude that the effect
on the corrupt individuals payoff is negative:
∂pi∗c
∂x
= (1− ρ)∂T
∂x
< 0. (3.16)
When the proportion of corrupt individuals in the population rises, the
price increases, generating an extraordinary profit for the individuals
that remain productive and produce,individually, a greater quantity,
making this activity relatively more attractive. Although the rise in
the profit of producers has a positive effect on pi∗c , the negative effect of
a decrease in the relative frequency of producers is bigger. This shrinks
the available rent for corruption per corrupt individual.
3.2 THE LONG RUN: EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
In Evolutionary Game Theory, a usual way of describing the
process for changes in strategies in a population of agents is using an
imitation principle as a microfundation to get an evolutionary dyna-
mics. In that case, we have a social learning process behind the evolti-
onary dynamics, where each agent learns by comparing her payoff with
other agents’ payoffs. As corruption gains are often kept secret just as
most firm’s profits, we will assume that the dynamics here follows the
satisficing principle, which is an individual learning process.
3.2.1 Transition between short runs as an evolutionary dyna-
mics
Each individual j of type k = c, n sets a target return µk, that
she considers to be the minimum acceptable. At each period, each
individual compares her current observed payoff, pi∗k, with µk and decide
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if she switches her strategy or not. She mantains the current strategy
if pi∗k ≥ µj . Otherwise, she changes her strategy.
Let us assume that the acceptable returns are randomly and
independently determined accross agents and over time, with a mono-
tonically increasing cumulative distribution function F : R+ → [0, 1].
Let F be continuous and differentiable. Thus, the individual j of type
k = c, n will be dissatisfied with her current strategy with probabi-
lity Prob(µj > pi
∗
k) = 1 − Prob(µj ≤ pi∗k) = 1 − F (pi∗k). Therefore,
a corrupt individual will be dissatisfied with her current payoff with
probability 1 − F (pi∗c ). Following Vega-Redondo (1996, p.91), we as-
sume that the probability with which she will choose the alternative
strategy depends on the relative frequency with which this strategy is
played. In other words, the dissatisfied individual measures the suc-
cessfulness of the other strategy by its relative frequency. The relative
frequency, therefore, is the probability that the dissatisfied individual
will in fact switch her strategy. In that manner, supposing these events
are statistically independent, the outflow from the corrupt population
is given by x[1 − F (pi∗1)](1 − x). Analogously, the outflow from the
productive population—which corresponds to the inflow to the corrupt
population—is given by (1 − x)[1 − F (pi∗2)]x. Combining the outflow
with the inflow, we have the net flow for the corrupt subpopulation:
x˙ = x(1− x)ϕ(x), (3.17)
where
ϕ(x) = F (pi∗c )− F (pi∗n). (3.18)
The satisficing evolutionary dynamics in (3.17) has as its space state the
interval (0, 1] ⊂ R and reflects an appropriate idea of selection. When
the payoff of the corrupt strategy is greater (less) than the payoff of
the alternative strategy, the proportion of individuals playing such a
strategy increases (decreases).
3.2.2 Long-run equilibria
Two different equilibria arise from the evolutionary dynamics in
(3.17). The monomorphic equilibrium is reached at x = 1, that is,
when the whole population is corrupt. The polymorphic equilibrium
is reached when ϕ = 0, that is, when the two types of strategy co-
exist. The latter is the most relevant one, as in most societies we
have a combination of corrupt and honest individuals. We will now
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prove that the polymorphic equilibrium exists and is unique, using the
Intermediate Value Theorem.
Based on (3.15) and (3.10), we know that:
lim
x→0+
pi∗c (x)− pi∗n(x) =∞, (3.19)
and
pi∗c (1)− pi∗n(1) = −
1− τ
b
(a− c)2 < 0. (3.20)
As F is strictly increasing, from (3.19) and (3.20), it follows that:
lim
x→0+
ϕ(x) = 1− F (pi∗n(0)) > 0, (3.21)
and
ϕ(1) = F (pi∗c (1))− F (pi∗n(1)) < 0. (3.22)
As ϕ(x) is continuous, considering (3.21) and (3.22), by the In-
termediate Value Theorem, there exists an x = x∗ such that ϕ(x∗) = 0.
Furthermore, since F is strictly positive, from (3.11) and (3.16)
we know that:
ϕ′(x) = F ′(pi∗c )
∂pi∗c
∂x
− F ′(pi∗n)
∂pi∗n
∂x
< 0. (3.23)
Thus, x∗ is unique.
From (3.11) and (3.16) we know that:
∂pi∗c
∂x
− ∂pi
∗
n
∂x
< 0. (3.24)
Since in the equilibrium pi∗c (x
∗) = pi∗n(x
∗), it follows from (3.24) that
pi∗c (x
∗) > pi∗n(x
∗), for all x ∈ (0, x∗) ⊂ R and pi∗c (x∗) < pi∗n(x∗), for all
x ∈ (x∗, 1) ⊂ R. As F is strictly increasing and x(1 − x) > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R, it follows that for all x ∈ (0, x∗) ⊂ R, ϕ(x) > 0 and
therefore x˙ > 0. And for all x ∈ (x∗, 1) ⊂ R, ϕ(x) < 0 and therefore
x˙ < 0. Thus, we can conclude that x = x∗ is an asymptotically stable
equibrium.
Since x˙ < 0 for values of x less than one nearby x = 1, this
equilibrium is locally unstable. This results are summarized in the
Figure 1.
In other words, when the economy begins at any x ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R
the only equilibrium to where the population is attracted to is x = x∗.
In other words, x = x∗ is evolutionarily stable.
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Figure 1 – Stability of x∗
Source: Created by the author.
3.3 LONG-RUN IMPACTS ON CORRUPTION
Using the existence condition F (pi∗c ) − F (pi∗n) = 0, we can take
the implicit derivatives of x∗ with respect to the parameters, and in-
vestigate their impact on the long run level of corruption.
The effect of the tax rate on x∗ is given by:
∂x∗
∂τ
= − 1
bϕ′(x)
(
a− c
2− x
)2[
(1− ρ)
(
1− x
x
)
+ 1
]
> 0 (3.25)
The greater the tax rate, the greater the available rent for corrupt
activities, therefore, the greater the long run level of corruption.
The derivative of x∗ with respect to ρ, considering (3.12) is:
∂x∗
∂ρ
=
F ′(pi∗)(T + ε)
ϕ′(x)
< 0, (3.26)
where pi∗ ≡ pi∗c = pi∗n and, therfore, F ′(pi∗) = F ′(pi∗c ) = F ′(pi∗n). As the
probability of being punished increases, the long run relative frequency
of corruption in the society decreases. The same is true for the size of
the punishment. The derivative of x∗ with respect to the punishment,
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ε, is:
∂x∗
∂ε
=
F ′(pi∗)ρ(T + 1)
ϕ′(x)
< 0. (3.27)
The greater the penalty for engaging in corrupt activities, the lower the
level of corruption in the long run.
Recall that, in the equilibrium, pi∗c (x
∗) = pi∗n(x
∗). Using (3.10)
and (3.15) this equality can be expressed as follows:
1
b
(
a− c
2− x
)2[
(1− ρ)τ (1− x)
x
− (1− τ)
]
= ρε. (3.28)
Considering (3.28), the effect of the marginal cost, c, on x∗ is:
∂x∗
∂c
=
2F ′(pi∗)
ϕ′(x)(a− c)ρε > 0. (3.29)
The greater the marginal cost, the less attractive is to be a producer,
and the greater is the level of corruption on the long run.
Lastly, the effect on x∗ of a rise on a, considering (3.28), is given
by:
∂x∗
∂a
= − 2F
′(pi∗)
ϕ′(x)(a− c)ρε < 0. (3.30)
That is, a positive demand shock causes the level of corruption to fall
on the long run.
3.4 FINAL REMARKS
Our results suggest that the evolutionary dynamics will always
lead the economy to a situation with permanent corruption. The level
of that corruption will depend on the parameters we are taking into
account. In our model, there is also a polymorphic (mixed) equilibrium,
where both corrupt and non-corrupt individuals co-exist.
When any non-zero and less than x∗ percentage of the population
initially chooses to be corrupt, being corrupt is a best response and the
dynamics converge to the equilibrium in which x∗ of the individuals
choose to be corrupt. If more than x∗ of the population, but not
everyone, initially chooses to be corrupt, then being honest is a best
response, and the evolutionary dynamics again converges to x∗. In
other words, x∗ is an evolutionary equilibrium. x = 1 is unstable, and
thus is not an evolutionary equilibrium.
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We can deduce some important relationships between our para-
meters and the level of corruption. As the chance of impunity increases
(as ρ gets closer to one) the proportion of corrupt individuals in the
equilibrium increases. In the same sense, as the tax rate increases,
the proportion of corrupt individuals in the equilibrium also increases.
That is due to two effects. On one hand, a higher tax rate discourages
private initiative for legal activities. On the other hand it makes the
amount of money available for corruption bigger, encouraging such a
practice. These results suggest that a strong state determined to com-
bat corruption may lower the incidence of such a practice. On the other
hand, a big government in the sectors that do not affect the probability
of punishment, tend to stimulate corruption. This results corroborate
the empirical evidence pointed by Goel e Nelson (2010) that bigger
governments are associated with higher levels of corruption, yet more
intervention might increase the likelihood of being punished.
The size of the punishment, ε, as it was expected, affects corrup-
tion negatively, as it represents the direct costs of being dishonest. A
higher marginal cost makes it less attractive to be a producer, raising
the level of corruption in the long run. Finally, a positive demand shock
causes the level of corruption to fall in the long run.
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4 CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN
EVOLUTIONARY GAME APPROACH
4.1 A SOLOW-SWAN MODEL WITH PRODUCTIVE GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE AND CORRUPTION
We will analyze the impact of corruption on economic growth
from an evolutionary game perspective, where the population of corrupt
individuals co-evolves with the capital stock over time. Following Barro
(1990) and Farida, Ahmadi-Esfahani et al. (2007) we will introduce
government expenditure and the level of corruption in a neoclassical
growth model to verify how corruption affects capital accumulation
in the long run. Our main hypotheses is that there is a leak in the
public budget, so that government spending does not match its tax
revenues. In that manner, corruption negatively affects the portion
of tax revenues alocated as productive government spending, G. The
more widespread the corruption, the smaller the government productive
expenditure and, therefore, the smaller the output.
The model economy is closed, producing a single homogeneous
good for both investment and consumption purposes. We assume that
the government provides services as an input to private production, as
in Barro (1990). The profit-maximing firms take as given the produc-
tive government and combine two (physically homogeneous) factors of
production, capital and labor, by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology.
As previously argued, in the presence of corruption, there is a leak in
the government budget, so that the productive government expendi-
ture, G, is lower than the tax revenue, T . The difference between them
is the amount of tax revenue diverted for corruption. We assume that
there is a fixed and large number H of households in the economy. At
a given moment, there is a fraction x = HcH of households that chooses
to be corrupt, where Hc is the number of corrupt households, which
varies over time according to an evolutionary dynamics to be shown in
Section 4.2. Thus, the amount of money each corrupt household earns
is
T −G
Hc
= φ(x)
T
H
, (4.1)
where φ(x) gives the fraction of tax revenue which is diverted for corrup-
tion, formally it satisfies the following conditions: φ′(x) > 0, φ(0) = 0
and φ(1) = 1. In sum, equation (4.1) states that the amount of tax
revenue diverted for corruption depends on the relative frequency of
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corruption in the economy.
We will assume that the government revenue is given by a flat-
rate income tax:
T = τY, (4.2)
where τ ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R is the income tax rate and Y is the output.
From now on, for simplicity, we will assume φ(x) = x. Thus,
using (4.2) we can rewrite (4.1) as follows:
G = (1− x2)τY. (4.3)
Therefore, when the degree of corruption, x, goes down, the productive
government spending, G, rises. This happens because a higher number
of households engaging in corruption increases the leak on the tax re-
venue. When corruption is absolute, x = 1, government expenditure is
zero. When there is no corruption, x = 0, the tax revenue is fully used
in productive government expenditure.
Dividing (4.3) by L, we have the government expenditure per
capita:
g = (1− x2)τy, (4.4)
where g ≡ GL and y ≡ YL are the productive government expenditure
per capita and the output per capita, respectively.
We will assume that the aggregate output is produced accor-
ding to a Cobb-Douglas function that satisfies the Inada conditions, as
follows:
Y = KαGβL1−(α+β), (4.5)
where K and L are the aggregate quantities of capital and labor, respec-
tively, and α ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R and β ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R are parametric constants.
Furthermore, α+ β < 1. Note that the Cobb-Douglas functional form
assumed shows constant returns to scale and states that every input is
equally necessary for production. In the absence of any of the inputs,
the production is null.
The intensive form of the aggregate production function (4.5) is
given by:
y = kαgβ , (4.6)
where k ≡ KL is the capital stock per capita.
Substituting (4.4) in (4.6), we have
y = ka[(1− x2)τ ]b, (4.7)
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where
a ≡ α
1− β ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R (4.8)
and
b ≡ β
1− β ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R. (4.9)
The disposable income in this economy is not only the net income
after taxes, Y −T , but also the portion of the government revenue that
was diverted by corruption, T − G. In short, Y d = Y − T + T − G =
Y −G. Thus, from (4.3) the aggregate disposable income is given by:
Y d = [1− (1− x2)τ ]Y. (4.10)
As in Solow (1956), the savings are a fraction of the disposable
income, S = sY d, where s ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R is the constant savings rate.
Using (4.10), the aggregate savings can be written as:
S = s[1− (1− x2)τ ]Y. (4.11)
Following Solow (1956), we will assume that the savings are fully
converted to investment, so that S = I. Besides, we will suppose for
simplicity, that there is no depreciation, so that the rate of change in
the capital stock is equal to the aggregate investment, K˙ = I. Thus,
using (4.11) we have:
K˙ = s[1− (1− x2)τ ]Y. (4.12)
Let us consider that the population, taken as equal to the labor
force, L, grows at a constant rate n > 0, that is:
L˙
L
= n. (4.13)
As k ≡ KL , the growth rate of the capital per capita is given by:
k˙
k
=
K˙
K
− L˙
L
. (4.14)
Substituting (4.12) and (4.13) into (4.14), we obtain:
k˙ = s[1− (1− x2)τ ]y − nk. (4.15)
This equation states that the capital stock per capita will incre-
ase (decrease) only if the savings per capita is greater (smaller) than
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the investment necessary to offset the population growth.
Substituting (4.7) in (4.15) we obtain the fundamental equation
of growth parameterized by the level of corruption:
k˙ = sh(x, τ)ka − nk, (4.16)
where
h(x, τ) ≡ [1− (1− x2)τ ][(1− x2)τ ]b. (4.17)
Note that h(x, τ) carries two different effects. The term 1− (1− x2)τ
can be called disposable income effect. When corruption increases, the
tax revenue leak will be greater, that accrues to corrupt households,
which will increase their consumption and savings. However, the rise
of corruption squeezes the productive government spending. This effect
is represented by the term [(1− x2)τ ]b.
We can rewrite (4.16) in terms of growth rate as follows:
kˆ ≡ k˙
k
= sh(x, τ)ka−1 − n. (4.18)
In equilibrium, when the aggregate capital stock grows at the
same rate as the population, that is when k˙ = 0, the steady state level
of capital per capita can be seen as a function of the corruption level:
k∗(x) =
[
sh(x, τ)
n
] 1
1−a
. (4.19)
Furthermore, note that as k approaches zero, kˆ goes toward in-
finity. As k goes to infinity, kˆ approaches −n. The growth rate of the
capital stock per capita is a decreasing and strictly convex function of
the capital stock per capita:
∂kˆ
∂k
= (a− 1)sh(x, τ)ka−2 < 0. (4.20)
Summarizing this information, we can draw a phase diagram for
kˆ for a given x, as shown in Figure 2. It is straightforward that k∗(x)
is a global attractor for a given x.
Before we analyze the relationship between the equilibrium ca-
pital stock per capita and the level of corruption, let us make some
observations about the tax rate that will help understand such relati-
onship.
Suppose the government’s goal is to maximize the growth rate of
47
Figure 2 – Phase diagram for kˆ
Source: Created by the author.
the capital stock per capita in the economy choosing a tax rate. Since
τ is limited in the interval [0, 1] ⊂ R and considering (4.9), then the
tax rate that maximizes (4.18) is
τ∗ = min
{
β
1− x2 , 1
}
. (4.21)
Figure 3 shows the graph for τ∗ with respect to x
Note that when corruption increases, τ∗ increases until it reaches
its maximum value, 1, where x =
√
1− β. In other words, when the
level of corruption is higher, the leakage in the public budget is bigger
and the tax rate that allows the government to achieve its optimum
expenditure level is higher.
The impact on the stock of capital per capita of the level of
corruption as well as the impact of the tax rate itself depend on the
gap between the actual tax rate and the optimum tax rate. When
the government overtaxes, it is reasonable to think that there is some
inefficiency or leak in public spending that will affect the availability of
resources for corruption. Formally:
∂h
∂x
= 2xτb[(1− x2)τ ]b−1
( τ
τ∗
− 1
)
(4.22)
and
∂h
∂τ
= b(1− x2)[(1− x2)τ ]b−1
(
1− τ
τ∗
)
. (4.23)
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Figure 3 – Optimum tax rate as a function of the level of corruption
Source: Created by the author.
Their signs will depend on the actual tax rate practiced by the govern-
ment in comparison to the optimal tax rate as sumarized below:
∂h
∂x

< 0, if 0 ≤ τ < τ∗,
= 0, if τ = τ∗,
> 0, if τ∗ < τ ≤ 1,
(4.24)
and
∂h
∂τ

> 0, if 0 ≤ τ < τ∗,
= 0, if τ = τ∗,
< 0, if τ∗ < τ ≤ 1.
(4.25)
Thus, an increase in the tax rate can have three different impacts
on the capital stock per capita. Deriving (4.19) with respect to τ we
have
∂k∗
∂τ
=
1
1− a
sk∗a
n
∂h
∂τ
. (4.26)
Based on (4.25) and (4.24), we know that when τ = τ∗ then the
capital stock per capita in the steady state is at its maximum. Thus,
when the government chooses τ = τ∗, it is not only maximizing the
growth rate of the capital stock per capita, it is also maximizing the
stock of capital per capita and the output per capita.
The effects of the level of corruption on the capital stock per
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capita also depend on the ratio between the actual tax rate charged by
the government and the optimum tax rate. Let us take the derivative
of k∗ with respect to x. This yields the expression below.
∂k∗
∂x
=
1
1− a
sk∗a
n
∂h
∂x
. (4.27)
Recall from (4.24), that, when the tax rate is below its optimum
level, ∂h∂x is negative. In that case, the level of corruption has a negative
impact on the stock of capital per capita. On the other hand, when
the tax rate is above its optimum level, ∂h∂x is positive, and the level of
corruption has a positive impact on k.
This result can be understood as analoguous to the “grease in
the wheels” argument. When the tax rate is above the optimum level,
there are more funds available for corruption, which induces corrupt
behavior. Since we assumed a closed economy with a homogeneous
savings rate, more corruption results in more available income. There-
fore, corruption transforms inefficient government expenditure (above
the optimum) into relatively more efficient private investment, leading
to a higher capital stock per capita. On the other hand, when the tax
rate is below the optimum, corruption would divert resources from a
relatively more efficient government to the private sector, causing an
adverse effect on the capital stock.
4.2 EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CORRUPTION
To complete our analysis, let us now define how the level of
corruption evolves over time.
We will assume that the society is composed of households who
can engage in corrupt activities or not. The number of households is
constant over time. There are H households, each one consisting of LH
individuals. Since H is fixed, each household grows at the same rate n.
Each member of a non-corrupt household (here identified by the
subscript n) has a disposable income given by:
ydn =
[
(1− τ)Y
H
]
1
L
H
= (1− τ)y. (4.28)
Because each household is concern about its LH members’ payoffs,
then the relevant payoff of an non-corrupt household is its per capita
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consumption. Considering (4.28), this consumption is given by:
un = (1− s)(1− τ)y. (4.29)
Substituting (4.7) into (4.29), we obtain:
un = (1− s)(1− τ)[(1− x2)τ ]bka. (4.30)
In addition to the disposable income enjoyed by all members of
society, each member of a corrupt household (identified by the subscript
c), earns a share of the surplus (4.1), given by T−GHc
1
L
H
= xτYH
1
L
H
= xτy.
Thus, their disposable income before considering the risk of punishment
is given by:
(1− τ)y + xτy. (4.31)
Let γ > 0 be the percentage of the income the corrupt individual
will have to pay back in case of being punished. Note that γ can be
greater than one. In that case, the punishment not only compensates
for corruption but also makes the corrupt household forfeit an amount
larger than his income. His disposable income after punishment would
be
(1− γ)[1− (1− x)τ ]y. (4.32)
Let  be the probability of punishment. Thus the income of each mem-
ber of a corrupt household can be expressed as the following expected
value:
ydc = (1− γ)[1− (1− x)τ ]y + (1− )[1− (1− x)τ ]y. (4.33)
We can rewrite (4.33) simply as
ydc = (1− ρ)[1− (1− x)τ ]y, (4.34)
where ρ ≡ γ is the expected punishment.
The expected payoff of each member of a corrupt household is
the portion of his expected disposable income reserved for consumption
and can be written as:
uc = (1− s)(1− ρ)[1− (1− x)τ ]y. (4.35)
Substituting (4.7) in (4.35) and using (4.17) we have:
uc = (1− s)(1− ρ)h(x, τ)ka. (4.36)
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Although in some situations the money from corruption is diver-
ted to other illegal activities or kept in bank accounts in other coun-
tries, and therefore does not return as an investment to the domestic
economy, here we assume a closed economy and the savings rate is
homogeneous across households. That is, the saving rate of each hou-
sehold does not depend on its type (corrupt or non-corrupt).
To describe the learning process through which the evolutionary
path happens, we will use the argument of the satisficing dynamics. We
will assume that household j has a target return that it considers to
be the minimum acceptable, denoted by µj . At instant t, if its current
payoff uj = u`, with ` = c, n, is higher than its target return, it will not
consider changing its strategy. Otherwise, when uj < µj , it will become
a strategy reviser. Let us assume that the target return is randomly
and independently determined accross households, with a cumulative
distribution function given by F : R→ [0, 1] ⊂ R, which is continuously
differentiable and strictly increasing. That being said, the probability
with which a household will find its current return unacceptable is
Prob(µj > uj) = 1− Prob(µj ≤ uj) = 1− F (uj). (4.37)
Thus, the non-corrupt household is willing to change its strategy
with probability 1 − F (un). It will do so by imitating the corrupt
individuals, who exhibit the alternative strategy, at a rate given by the
proportion of corrupt individuals it observes in the society, x. Hence,
the inflow for the corrupt subpopulation is given by:
(1− x)[1− F (un)]x. (4.38)
Analogously, the outflow from the corrupt subpopulation is given
by:
x[1− F (uc)](1− x). (4.39)
Subtracting (4.39) from (4.38) we find the following satisficing
evolutionary dynamics:
x˙ = x(1− x)[F (uc)− F (un)]. (4.40)
As F is a strictly increasing function, an increase in the per
capita consumption of non-corrupt households will cause the number
of dissatisfied corrupt households to rise. Analogously, if there is a rise
in the corrupt household’s per capita consumption, the corrupt activity
will become relatively more appealing and the number of dissatisfied
non-corrupt households will rise. In sum, the evolutionary dynamic in
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(4.40) reflects the behavior of a selection mechanism according to which
the proportion of corrupt households varies positively with the relative
fitness of such a strategy.
4.3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We will now show that our model has two monomorphic (pure
strategy) equilibria where only one of the strategies survive and one
long run polymorphic (mixed strategy) equilibrium, where both cor-
rupt and non-corrupt strategies survive in the long run. Then, we will
analyze the stability of each of these equilibria.
The state transition of the economy is determined by the ordi-
nary differetial equations (4.16) and (4.40), which are repeated here by
convenience:{
x˙ = x(1− x)[F (uc(x, k(x)))− F (un(x, k(x)))],
k˙ = sh(x, τ)ka − nk. (4.41)
The state space is defined by Θ ≡ {(x, k) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, k ≥
0}
It is straightforward that x = 0 and x = 1 both satisfy x˙ = 0.
These are the two monomorphic equilibria.
When being corrupt or non-corrupt yield the same expected
payoff, that is, when uc − un = 0, the system reaches a polymorphic
equilibria. In this kind of equilibrium there might still exist dissatisfied
households that are willing to change their strategies, but the outflow
of both subpopulations will be equal. Subtracting (4.29) from (4.35)
we have
uc − un = (1− s)y[(1− ρ)τx− ρ(1− τ)]. (4.42)
When the difference between the payoffs is equal to zero, the solution
x∗ for (4.42), which is the polymorphic equilibrium, is
x∗ =
1− τ
τ
ρ
1− ρ (4.43)
The conditions according to which x∗ ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R are summa-
rized in Table 1.
To show that the system is in equilibrium in each of the cases
described above, we need to show for what k values the condition k˙ = 0
is satisfied. More specifically, when all the households choose to play
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Table 1 – Conditions for existence of x∗
ρ = 0 x∗ = 0
0 < ρ < τ x∗ ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R
ρ = τ x∗ = 1
ρ > τ @x∗ ∈ (0, 1) ⊂ R
Source: Created by the author
the non-corrupt strategy, x = 0, the equilibrium capital stock per capita
in this economy is, from (4.19):
k∗(0) =
[
s(1− τ)τ b
n
] 1
1−a
. (4.44)
When all the households choose to play the corrupt strategy, x = 1,
the equilibrium capital stock per capita is:
k∗(1) = 0. (4.45)
Finally, in the polymorphic equilibrium, when a portion of the
households choose to be corrupt and the other portion does not, the
equilibrium capital stock per capita is:
k∗(x∗) =
[
sh(x∗, τ)
n
] 1
1−a
. (4.46)
We know, from (4.19), that for all values of k∗, k˙ = 0. We can
then draw the isocline k˙ = 0 in Figure 4. In k˙ = 0, the impact of a
small change in k over k˙ is given by:
∂k˙
∂k
= (a− 1)n < 0, (4.47)
which is negative, since by assumption a is strictly less than 1. Suppose
the economy begins in a point k0 = k
∗(x), that is, k0 is on the isocline
k˙ = 0. A positive shock in k, so that k now is above the isocline
k˙ = 0, will cause the economy to move back towards the isocline k˙ = 0,
as (4.47) states. This movement is represented by the arrows pointing
down on regions I and II in Figure 4. Analogously, if there is a negative
shock in k, the economy will again move back towards the isocline k˙.
This movement is represented by the arrows pointing up on regions III
and IV in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 – Phase diagram for k and x, when 0 < ρ < τ
Source: Created by the author.
We can draw three vertical isoclines for when x˙ = 0. One for
x = 0, one for x = 1 and a last one for x = x∗. We know that in the
polymorphic equilibrium, when x = x∗, from (4.42), uc − un = 0 and
hence x˙ = 0. Thus, when 0 < x < x∗, we know that uc − un < 0 and
therefore x˙ < 0. This is represented by the arrows pointing to the left
in regions II and III in Figure 4. Analogously, when x∗ < x < 1,
uc − un > 0 and x˙ > 0. This is represented by the arrows pointing to
the right in regions I and IV in Figure 4.
Equilibrium (x∗, k∗(x∗)) is a saddle point, while equilibria (0, k∗(0))
and (0, 1) are local attractors. The stable arm of x∗ is the boundary
line between the attraction basins of the two monomorphic equilibria.
The proof for the stability of the equilibria (0, k∗(0)) and (0, 1) are
shown in Apendix A and Apendix B, respectively.
When the expected punishment, ρ, moves towards zero, the
boundary line x∗ moves towards x = 0, increasing the attraction basin
of the full corruption equilibrium. Alternatively, when ρ moves towards
τ , the boundary x∗ moves towards x = 1, increasing the attraction ba-
sin of the equilibrium in absence of corruption. The extreme situations,
when ρ = 0 and when ρ = τ , are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, res-
pectively.
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Figure 5 – Phase diagram for k and x, when ρ = 0
Source: Created by the author.
When the tax rate increases, for a given expected punishment,
the polymorphic equilibrium level of corruption decreases, increasing
the attraction basin for the full corruption equilibrium. If the tax rate
decreases, x∗ increases, increasing the attraction basin for the equili-
brium with no corruption.
The relationship between τ and τ∗ does not affect our conclusi-
ons about the stability of the equilibria, although it might affect the
transition dynamics through which the equilibria are reached. When τ
is greater than β, the demarcation curve k˙ = 0 can be nonmonotonic.
When that happens, although k converges to the equilibria, it might
not converge in a monotonic manner.
Differently from the original Solow-Swan model, in which the
transition dynamics on the stationary state is monotonic, in our model
the dynamics is not monotonic. If the starting point in the economy
is, for example, point A in Figure 4, where k is above its stationary
level, the effect of the productive government expenditure exceeds the
effect of the available income, in a way that even when corruption is
declining, we observe a fall in the stock of capital per capita. However,
after a certain point with low enough corruption (pointB), the available
income effect starts to exceed the productive government expenditure
effect, in a way that the agregate savings now generate gross investment
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Figure 6 – Phase diagram for k and x, when ρ ≥ τ
Source: Created by the author.
that overcomes breakeven investment, leading to a rise on the stock of
capital per capita.
4.4 FINAL REMARKS
The stability of the equilibria depends on the relationship between
the expected punishment, ρ, and the tax rate, τ . Three cases arise.
When the expected punishment is in between zero and the tax rate,
there exists a polymorphic (mixed) equilibrium, x∗. This equilibrium
is, however, a saddle point. If the dynamic starts in a level of cor-
ruption below x∗, it leads the economy towards the equilibrium where
corruption is erradicated. On the other hand, if the dynamic starts in a
level of corruption above x∗, it leads the economy to a collapse, where
corruption is the norm and the capital stock per capita as well as the
aggregate output are null.
This extreme result is due to our choice concerning the produc-
tion function functional form. The Cobb-Douglas technology implies
that every factor of production is essential. Therefore, when the go-
vernment revenue is fully diverted as corruption, so that G is zero, the
economy collapses. For future research we suggest using a functional
form that allows for zero government expenditure without an economi-
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cal breakdown, which is a more realistic premise.
The second case happens when the expected punishment is equal
to or greater than the tax rate. In this case, when the expected punish-
ment is sufficiently high, the dynamic leads to the equilibrium where
corruption is erradicated. That is, the expected punishment is able to
control outright corruption.
In the third case, when households expect no punishment for
corrupt acts, we have that corruption becomes the norm in the society
and again the economy collapses.
Both variables, the expected punishment and the tax rate, are
under the control of the public sector. However, the former is less fle-
xible and demands more complex institutional reforms to be changed.
The tax rate, in contrast, can be adjusted through relatively less com-
plicated decisions. If the tax rate is too high, the expected punishment
sufficient to make the full corruption equilibrium unstable and elimi-
nate the mixed equilibrium, eradicating corruption, must be greater.
On the other hand, a smaller tax rate guarantees that even relatively
small expected punishments could erradicate corruption.
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5 CONCLUSION
We analyze some of the features of corruption as well as their
implications in two different models from an evolutionary games appro-
ach. We believe that evolutionary games are a well suited tool to deal
with the corruption issue in economics, since they allow us to consider
a scenario where a large group of individuals makes decisions simu-
taneosly with a bounded understanding of the consequences of their
actions.
In the first model we devised an evolutionary game with a ho-
mogeneous population where individuals may choose to behave as a
producer or as a corrupt citizen who expropriates the taxes payed to
the government. We show that corruption will always be present in
this context and its relative frequency will depend on the probability
of being punished, the size of the punishment, the tax rate and the
marginal cost of the productive strategy. This result points to the im-
portance of the public sector in fighting corruption, since many of these
variables are under control of the public choice or can be affected by it.
More specifically, as the chance of impunity increases (as ρ gets
closer to one) the proportion of corrupt individuals in the long run
equilibrium increases. In the same sense, as the tax rate increases,
the proportion of corrupt individuals in the equilibrium also increases.
That is due to two effects. On one hand, a higher tax rate discourages
private initiative for legal activities. On the other hand it makes the
amount of money available for corruption bigger, encouraging such a
practice. These results suggest that a strong government determined
to combat corruption may lower the incidence of such a practice. On
the other hand, a big government in the sectors that do not affect the
probability of punishment, tend to stimulate corruption. These results
corroborate the empirical evidence found by Goel e Nelson (2010) that
bigger governments are associated with higher levels of corruption, yet
more intervention might increase the likelihood of being punished.
The size of the punishment, ε, as it was expected, affects corrup-
tion negatively, as it represents the direct costs of being dishonest. A
higher marginal cost makes it less attractive to be a producer, raising
the level of corruption in the long run. Finally, a positive demand shock
causes the level of corruption to fall in the long run.
In the second model we augmented the Solow-Swan model with
productive government spending to consider for corruption. We then
developed an evolutionary game with two dynamic equations. The first
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describes the change in the capital stock per capita and the second
describes the evolution on the population of corrupt individuals over
time.
Three situations arise in the model depending on the interaction
between the tax rate and the expected punishment. When the expected
punishment is non-zero but too low, below the tax rate, there exists
a polymorphic equilibrium. This equilibrium is a saddle point, that
is, if the dynamic starts in a level of corruption below x∗, it leads the
economy towards the equilibrium where corruption is erradicated. On
the other hand, if the dynamic starts in a level of corruption above
x∗, it leads the economy to a collapse, where corruption is the norm
and the capital stock per capita as well as the aggregate output are
null. Intuitively, the mixed equilibrium is a watershed. If the system
starts at a point below the mixed equilibrium, it will be attracted to a
corruption-free situation. If it starts above the mixed equilibrium, the
dynamics will lead to a situation where everyone chooses to act in a
corrupt manner.
The second case happens when the expected punishment is equal
to or greater than the tax rate. In this case, when the expected punish-
ment is sufficiently high, the dynamic leads to the equilibrium where
corruption is erradicated. That is, the expected punishment is able to
control outright corruption.
In the third case, when households expect no punishment for cor-
ruption acts, we have that corruption becomes the norm in the society
and the economy collapses.
Our models are only an attempt to help to understand the phe-
nomenon of corruption and how it affects economic growth and try to
explain why it is so persistent in societies. The results we found cor-
roborate some of the empirical evidence in the literature. For future
research we suggest developing our second model for a different pro-
duction function technology, where the government expenditure has a
positive but not crucial role in the output. Furthermore, we suggest
the expected punishment and the tax rate to be endogenized as the
government becomes a player in the game. We also suggest our results
to be tested empirically.
APPENDIX A -- Proof of the local asymptotic stability of
the equilibrium (0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ
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Let (x0, k0) ≡
(
x(0), k(0)
) ∈ Θ be the initial state of the
economy. In order to show that for any initial condition (x0, k0) ∈
{(x, k) ∈ Θ : 0 < x < x∗} the economy moves asymptotically
toward the equilibrium (0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ, we need to express the dy-
namic system (4.41) in terms of the deviation from the equilibrium
(0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ to apply the second (or direct) method of Lyapunov
for stability (GANDOLFO, 1996). As the state variable x vanishes at this
equilibrium, it is already the deviation of the level of corruption from
the steady state (0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ. Let k˜ ≡ k− k∗(0) be the deviation
of state variable k from its value at the equilibrium (0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ.
Thus, the dynamic system (4.41) can be rewritten in terms of the va-
riables x and k˜ as follows:
{
x˙ = x(1− x)[F (uc(x, k˜ + k∗(0)))− F (un(x, k˜ + k∗(0)))]
˙˜
k = sh(x, τ )
(
k˜ + k∗(0)
)a − n(k˜ + k∗(0)),
(A.1)
where
uc
(
x, k˜ + k∗(0)
)
= (1− s)(1− ρ)[1− (1− x)τ ](
k˜ + k∗(0)
)a
[(1− x2)τ ]b, (A.2)
and
un
(
x, k˜+k∗(0)
)
= (1−s)(1−τ )(k˜+k∗(0))a[(1−x2)τ ]b. (A.3)
If the economy begins in region II, that is, if (x0, k0) ∈ RII ≡
{(x, k) ∈ Θ : 0 < x < x∗, k > k∗(x)}, as t increases, the economy
reaches a point at k˙ = 0 locus. At this point the economy reaches the
following (bounded and closed) compact and positive invariant set:
ΩIII = {(x, k) ∈ Θ : 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 < min{x∗, 1},
min{k0, k∗(x0)} ≤ k ≤ k∗(x), (A.4)
or in terms of the new coordinate (x, k˜):
Ω˜III = {(x, k˜) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ x0 < min{x∗, 1},
min{k0 − k∗(0), k∗(x0)− k∗(0)} ≤ k ≤ k∗(x)− k∗(0)}. (A.5)
If the economy begins in region III, that is, if (x0, k0) ∈ RIII ≡
{(x, k) ∈ Θ : 0 < x < x∗, k ≤ k∗(x)}, it is already in the set ΩIII .
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Consider the following continuously differentiable function:
V (x, k˜) =
k˜2 + x2
2
. (A.6)
V is clearly positive definite, since V (x, k˜) > 0 for any (x, k˜) 6= 0
and V (0, 0) = 0.
As it has already been shown (cf. Figure 4), we know that x˙ < 0
and k˙ > 0 for all (x, k) ∈ RIII ≡ {(x, k) ∈ Θ : 0 < x < x∗, k ≤
k∗(x)}. Therefore, since ΩIII ⊂ RIII , it follows that x˙ < 0 and
˙˜k = k˙ > 0 for all (x, k) ∈ ΩIII and, consequently, x˙ < 0 and
˙˜k = k˙ > 0 for all (x, k˜) ∈ Ω˜III . Considering all these properties, we
are able to infer that:
V˙ = k˜k˙ + xx˙ < 0 (A.7)
for all (x, k) ∈ Ω˜III . Thus, (A.6) is a Lyapunov function and the
equilibrium (0, k∗(0)) is locally asymptotically stable. In other words,
if the economy begins in regions II or III, it converges towards the
equilibrium (0, k∗(0)) ∈ Θ.
APPENDIX B -- Proof of the local asymptotic stability of
the equilibrium (1, 0) ∈ Θ
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Let (x0, k0) ≡
(
x(0), k(0)
) ∈ Θ be the initial state of the
economy. It has already been shown that, if (x0, k0) ∈ {(x, k) ∈ Θ
: x = 1 or k = 0}, the economy will converge asymptotically towards
the equilibrium (1, 0) ∈ Θ, as represented in the Figure 4. In order
to show that for any initial condition (x0, k0) ∈ {(x, k) ∈ Θ : x∗ <
x < 1} the economy moves asymptotically toward the equilibrium
(1, 0) ∈ Θ, we need to express the dynamic system (4.41) in terms of
the deviation from the equilibrium (1, 0) ∈ Θ to apply the second (or
direct) method of Lyapunov for stability (GANDOLFO, 1996). As the
state variable k vanishes at this equilibrium, it is already the deviation
of capital stock per capita from the steady state (1, 0) ∈ Θ. Let
x˜ ≡ x − 1 be the deviation of state variable x from its value at
the equilibrium (1, 0) ∈ Θ. Thus, the dynamic system (4.41) can be
rewritten in terms of the variables x˜ and k as follows:
{
˙˜x = −x˜(1 + x˜)[F (uc(1 + x˜, k))− F (un(1 + x˜, k))]
k˙ = sh(1 + x˜, τ )ka − nk, (B.1)
where
uc(1+ x˜, k) = (1−s)(1−ρ)[1+ x˜τ ]ka
[
(1− (1+ x˜)2)τ ]b, (B.2)
un(1 + x˜, k) = (1− s)(1− τ )ka
[
(1− (1 + x˜)2)τ ]b (B.3)
and
h(1 + x˜, k) = [1− (1 + x˜)2τ ](−x˜τ )b. (B.4)
If the economy begins in region IV , that is, if (x0, k0) ∈ RIV ≡
{(x, k) ∈ Θ : x∗ < x < 1, 0 < k < k∗(x)}, as t increases, the
economy reaches a point at k˙ locus. At this point the economy reaches
the following (bounded and closed) compact and positive invariant set:
ΩI = {(x, k) ∈ Θ : max{0, x∗} < x0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
k∗(x) ≤ k ≤ max{k0, k∗(x0)}}, (B.5)
or in terms of the new coordinates (x˜, k):
Ω˜I = {(x˜, k) ∈ R2 : max{−1, x∗ − 1} < x0 − 1 ≤ x˜ ≤ 0,
k∗(x) ≤ k ≤ max{k0, k∗(x0)}}, (B.6)
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If the economy begins in region I, that is, if (x0, k0) ∈ RI ≡
{(x, k) ∈ Θ : x∗ < x < 1, k ≥ k∗(x)}, it is already in the set ΩI .
Consider the following continuously differentiable function:
V (x˜, k) =
k2 + x˜2
2
. (B.7)
V is clearly positive definite, since V (x˜, k) > 0 for any (x˜, k) 6= 0
and V (0, 0) = 0.
As it has already been shown (cf. Figure 4), we know that x˙ > 0
and k˙ < 0 for all (x, k) ∈ RI ≡ {(x, k) ∈ Θ : x∗ < x < 1, k ≥
k∗(x)}. Therefore, since ΩI ⊂ RI , it follows that ˙˜x = x˙ > 0 and
k˙ < 0 for all (x, k) ∈ ΩI and, consequently, ˙˜x = x˙ > 0 and k˙ < 0
for all (x, k) ∈ Ω˜I . Considering all these properties, we are able to
infer that:
V˙ = kk˙ + xx˙ < 0 (B.8)
for all (x, k) ∈ Ω˜I . Thus, (B.7) is a Lyapunov function and the
equilibrium (1, 0) is locally asymptotically stable. In other words,
if the economy begins in regions I or IV , it converges towards the
equilibrium (1, 0) ∈ Θ.
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